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Bernard H. Oxman*
* Richard A. Hausler Professor of Law, University of Miami School of
Law. The author was among counsel for the Republic of the Philippines
in the South China Sea arbitration. The views expressed herein are his
own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Philippines. This effort
highlights some key features of the award but cannot begin to capture its
richness, complexity, and precision. The author would like to thank
Patrick Gudridge for his helpful comments on a prior draft.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines submitted to
arbitration under the compromissory clauses of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea its dispute with
China regarding the interpretation and application of the
Convention in the South China Sea. On July 12, 2016, the
arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the
Convention rendered a unanimous award of almost 500
pages in which it found China’s expansive maritime claims
and related actions in the South China Sea to be inconsistent
with the Convention.1 “It goes without saying that both
Parties are obliged . . . to comply with the Convention and
this Award in good faith.” 2 (Award, Merits, para. 1200).
1 “[T]he Tribunal accepts that China has asserted its claim to rights in
the waters within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines baselines in good
faith. That the Tribunal disagrees with China’s understanding of its
rights and considers that there is no possible legal basis for China’s
claimed rights does not mean that China’s understanding has not been
genuinely held.” (Award, Merits, para. 704).
2 China ratified the Convention on June 7, 1996 and the Philippines
on May 8, 1984.
The first article of Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention on
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions, Article 286 provides,
“Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been
reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party
to the dispute to the court or Tribunal having jurisdiction under this
section.”
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The award of July 12, 2016 (cited herein as “Award,
Merits”), the earlier award on jurisdiction and admissibility
of October 29, 2015 (cited herein as “Award, Jurisdiction”),
and other documents can be found at
https://pcacases.com/web/view/7. Two maps of the South
China Sea included in the award are appended below.
(Award, Merits, Map 1, p. 9, Map 3, p. 125). Also appended
is a copy of the map showing the “nine-dash line” that
If they wish, States may make a declaration on choice of forum
under paragraph 1 of Article 287. But if, like China and the Philippines,
they opt not to do so, then under paragraph 3 of that article they “shall
be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.”
Article 9 of Annex VII provides inter alia, “If one of the parties to the
dispute does not appear before the Tribunal or fails to defend its case,
the other party may request the Tribunal to continue the proceedings
and to make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend
its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.”
Article 288, paragraph 4, of the Convention provides, “In the event
of a dispute as to whether a court or Tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by decision of that court or Tribunal.”
Article 296, paragraph 1, of the Convention provides, “Any decision
rendered by a court or Tribunal having jurisdiction under this section
shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the
dispute.” Article 11 of Annex VII adds, “The award shall be final and
without appeal, unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance
to an appellate procedure. It shall be complied with by the parties to the
dispute.”
Article 300 of the Convention provides inter alia, “States Parties shall
fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention.”
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accompanied China’s notes verbales of May 7, 2009 to the
U.N. Secretary-General. 3 (Award, Merits, Figure 2, p. 77).
“China presented a note verbale to the Department of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines on 19 February 2013,
rejecting the arbitration and returning the Notification and
Statement of Claim to the Philippines.” (Award, Jurisdiction,
para. 27). China did not exercise its right under Annex VII to
appoint one of the five arbitrators and to join with the
Philippines in selecting three. In that situation, Article 3(e) of
Annex VII provides that the President of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)4 shall make the
3 The “nine-dash line” is depicted on the map accompanying two
notes verbales of May 7, 2009 from China’s Permanent Mission to the
United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding
the submission of Viet Nam and the joint submission of Malaysia and
Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS). (Award, Merits, para. 169, n.131, para. 182). The notes stated
inter alia:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in
the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant
waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see
attached map). The above position is consistently held
by the Chinese Government, and is widely known by
the international community.
“What has become known as the ‘nine-dash line’ first appeared on
an official Chinese map in 1948.” (Award, Merits, para. 181).
4 At the time Judge Shunji Yanai, a national of Japan, was President
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
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necessary appointments.5 The result was an expert,
experienced, and exacting panel of extraordinary
distinction.6
China also declined to participate in the proceedings.
That said, its Foreign Ministry and other officials
commented publicly on certain issues; some of those
statements were transmitted by China’s ambassador in The
Hague to the members of the Tribunal either directly or
through the PCA registry with the caveat that this did not
mean that China was participating. This included a lengthy
Position Paper of December 7, 2014 setting forth
jurisdictional objections that was released and transmitted
shortly before the deadline for submission of a counter-
memorial. The Tribunal treated it and related letters as a
5 Annex VII provides for the appointments by the ITLOS President to
be made from a list of arbitrators to which each State Party to the
Convention is entitled to nominate up to four individuals.
6 The Philippines appointed Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum, a national of
Germany. In the absence of an appointment by China, the President of
ITLOS appointed Judge Stanislaw Pawlak, a national of Poland. In the
absence of agreement of the parties on the remaining appointments, the
ITLOS President then appointed Judge Jean-Pierre Cot, a national of
France, Professor Alfred H.A. Soons, a national of the Netherlands, and
as president Judge Thomas A. Mensah, a national of Ghana (following
the withdrawal of Ambassador M.C.W. Pinto, a national of Sri Lanka,
shortly after his appointment). (Award, Jurisdiction, paras. 28-31;
Award, Merits, para. 30).
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plea on jurisdiction.7 (Award, Jurisdiction, paras. 15, 104;
Award, Merits, para. 13).
Although its ambassador’s letter delivering China’s
jurisdictional objections described them as comprehensive,
the Tribunal made clear during the proceedings that it
would not deem China to have waived other jurisdictional
limitations.8 This is but one indication of the seriousness
with which the Tribunal viewed its duty, in the absence of
the respondent, to “satisfy itself not only that it has
jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well
founded in fact and law.” In this regard the Tribunal noted
“that Article 9 of Annex VII [which sets forth that obligation]
does not operate to change the burden of proof or to raise or
lower the standard of proof normally expected of a party to
make out its claims or defences. However, as a practical
matter, Article 9 has led the Tribunal to take steps to test the
evidence provided by the Philippines and to augment the
record by seeking additional evidence, expert input, and
Party submissions relevant to questions arising in this merits
phase, including as to the status of features in the South
China Sea, the allegations concerning violations of maritime
7 Russia’s statement regarding jurisdiction conveyed by note verbale
had been similarly characterized in paragraph 5 and in the glossary of
defined terms of the 2014 Award on Jurisdiction in the Artic Sunrise
arbitration in which Russia declined to participate.
8 Readers may recall that in paragraphs 76 to 95 of its 2001 judgment,
ITLOS dismissed the Grand Prince case on jurisdictional grounds that
were not invoked by a respondent that participated fully in the
proceedings.
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safety obligations, and claims about damage to the marine
environment.” (Award, Merits, para. 131 (footnote omitted)).
9
The Tribunal bifurcated the oral proceedings in light
of China’s jurisdictional objections. It held a hearing on
jurisdiction and admissibility from July 7 to 13, 2015, and a
subsequent hearing on the merits from November 24 to 30,
2015 that also included those jurisdictional issues deferred to
the merits stage.10 Both hearings were attended by observer
delegations from Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Viet Nam. Observers from Australia and Singapore attended
the hearing on the merits. 11 The states granted observer
9 These steps are outlined in detail in the ensuing paragraphs of the
award. (Award, Merits, paras. 132-142).
10 In order to accommodate the large number of individuals in
attendance from the Philippines and the observer delegations, the
hearings were held in the Great Hall of Justice at the Peace Palace in The
Hague rather than in one of its smaller arbitration hearing rooms.
11 The United Kingdom decided not to send an observer to the
hearing on the merits after its request for “neutral observer status” was
granted. The United States request to send an observer to that hearing
“[a]s a major coastal and maritime State, and as a State that is continuing
to pursue its domestic Constitutional processes to accede to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” was not granted; the
Tribunal decided that “only interested States parties to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea will be admitted as
observers.” (Award, Merits, paras. 65-68).
Readers may recall that ITLOS, in paragraph 24 of its 2015 advisory
opinion on fisheries, concluded that a written statement from the United
States should be considered as part of the case file because the United
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status were also afforded access to certain documents. While
the Tribunal did not open the hearings to the public,
verbatim records were made available to China promptly
and were later published on the PCA website.
Prior to the hearings, at approximately the same time
that China issued its Position Paper on jurisdiction, Viet
Nam delivered to the Tribunal a statement of its Foreign
Ministry. That statement described the nature of Viet Nam’s
interest, affirmed the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, rejected China’s
claims and actions based on the nine-dash line, stated that
none of the maritime features mentioned by the Philippines
in the proceedings can generate maritime entitlements in
excess of 12 nautical miles because they are either low-tide
elevations or rocks which cannot sustain human habitation
or economic life of their own, and reserved the right to
intervene. (Award, Merits, para. 36; Award, Jurisdiction,
para. 54).
II. JURISDICTION
The Tribunal’s award on the merits incorporates the
conclusions of its earlier award of October 29, 2015 on
jurisdiction and admissibility. That award addressed China’s
assertions in its December 7, 2014 Position Paper that the
Tribunal lacks jurisdiction because, in China’s words:
States was a party to the Law of the Sea Convention’s 1995
Implementation Agreement on straddling fish stocks.
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• The essence of the subject-matter of the
arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over
several maritime features in the South China
Sea, which is beyond the scope of the
Convention and does not concern the
interpretation or application of the
Convention;
• China and the Philippines have agreed,
through bilateral instruments and the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, to settle their relevant
disputes through negotiations. By unilaterally
initiating the present arbitration, the
Philippines has breached its obligation under
international law; 12
• Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-
matter of the arbitration were concerned with
the interpretation or application of the
Convention, that subject-matter would
constitute an integral part of maritime
delimitation between the two countries, thus
falling within the scope of the declaration filed
by China in 2006 in accordance with the
Convention, which excludes, inter alia, disputes
concerning maritime delimitation from
compulsory arbitration and other compulsory
12 The Tribunal also considered proprio motu whether the dispute
settlement provisions of certain treaties had similar effect.
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dispute settlements. (Award, Jurisdiction, para.
14, quoting para. 3 of China’s Position Paper
(footnote added)).
These challenges to jurisdiction were not accepted. In
its Statement of Claim and subsequent pleadings, the
Philippines expressly excluded disputes regarding territorial
sovereignty. The Tribunal concluded that it could determine
whether a feature was amenable to appropriation and
capable of generating entitlement to maritime zones, and if
so which zones, without resolving questions of disputed
territorial sovereignty over that feature. The Tribunal
observed “that it is entirely possible to approach the
Philippines’ Submissions from the premise
. . . that China is correct in its assertion of sovereignty over
Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys.” (Award, Jurisdiction,
para. 153; Award, Merits, para. 447).
In addition the Tribunal found that the Declaration of
Conduct was not a legally binding instrument, and that none
of the instruments examined precluded resort to the
Convention’s compulsory dispute settlement procedures
under Articles 281 and 282 of the Convention. (Award,
Jurisdiction, paras. 212-218, 300, 301, 413(E)).13
13 The Tribunal agreed with the previously expressed view of the
Law of the Sea Tribunal that although other agreements may contain
rights or obligations similar to or identical with the rights and
obligations set out in the Convention, the rights and obligations under
those agreements have a separate existence from those under the
Convention. (Award, Jurisdiction, para. 178). Citing the dissenting
opinion of Sir Kenneth Keith with approval, the Tribunal indicated its
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In its Statement of Claim and subsequent pleadings,
the Philippines also expressly excluded disputes regarding
maritime delimitation covered by Article 298 and China’s
declaration thereunder. The Tribunal concluded that the
question of whether a feature generated maritime
jurisdiction, and if so where and what kind, was separate
from the question of delimitation of overlapping maritime
jurisdictional zones and could be addressed without
reaching delimitation issues. (Award, Jurisdiction, paras.
400-401, 403-404; see also Award, Merits, paras. 391-396).
Although China had not raised a question regarding
absent parties, the Tribunal considered the issue and held
that third-state claimants were not indispensable parties. It
distinguished “the few cases in which an international court
or tribunal has declined to proceed due to the absence of an
indispensable third party” and noted inter alia Viet Nam’s
express communication to the Tribunal that it had no doubt
that the Tribunal had jurisdiction. The Tribunal added, “Like
Viet Nam, Malaysia and Indonesia have received copies of
the pleadings and attended the hearings as observers and
Brunei Darussalam has been provided with copies of
documents. No argument has been made by China, the
disagreement with the majority decision in the Southern Bluefin Tuna
arbitration, on which China relied, that notwithstanding the absence of
any express language to this effect, the dispute settlement provisions of
another agreement, if they do not provide for compulsory jurisdiction,
may imply that they preclude resort to the compulsory jurisdiction
provisions of the Convention under Article 281. (Award, Jurisdiction,
paras. 221-225, 285-286).
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Philippines, or the neighbouring States that their
participation is indispensable to the Tribunal proceeding
with this case.” (Award, Jurisdiction, paras. 181, 183, 187-
188). The Tribunal reaffirmed its prior conclusion in
response to a communication from Malaysia delivered on
June 23, 2016. (Award, Merits, paras. 634-641).
Although China also did not invoke the optional
exception for disputes concerning military activities under
its August 2006 declaration pursuant to Article 298, that
exception was held to apply to the Philippine submission
concerning the standoff between Philippine armed forces
personnel and Chinese government vessels at Second
Thomas Shoal.14 (Award, Merits, para. 1161). On the other
hand, “[t]he Tribunal will not deem activities to be military
in nature when China itself has consistently resisted such
classifications and affirmed the opposite at the highest
level.” Accordingly, the Tribunal did not apply the military
activities exception to the submissions concerning China’s
construction activities, noting that China had repeatedly
stated that the facilities it was building in the Spratlys were
intended exclusively or primarily for civilian use. Shortly
14 This jurisdictional limitation applied to the Philippine allegation
that China aggravated and extended the dispute by interfering with
Philippine access to Second Thomas Shoal and to its personnel posted on
a grounded ship there. In the context of other submissions, the Tribunal
concluded that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation that is not
subject to appropriation and, as between the parties to the case, forms
part of the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines. It reached the
same conclusion regarding Mischief Reef. (Award, Merits, paras. 381,
647, 1040).
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before the hearing on the merits President Xi Jinping stated
at a White House press conference, with reference to China’s
construction activities in the Nansha [Spratly] Islands, that
“China does not intend to pursue militarization.” (Award,
Merits, paras. 937, 1027, 1028, 1164).
The same clause of Article 298 that permits
declarations excluding disputes relating to sea boundary
delimitations also refers to those involving historic bays or
titles. China’s Position Paper invoked the former but not the
latter exclusion. The Tribunal nevertheless considered
whether the latter exclusion applied. It distinguished the
reference to historic title from a broader notion of historic
rights, and interpreted the former to refer to claims to
sovereignty, noting its association with claims to internal
waters or a territorial sea. Both are close to shore and are
subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state. After detailed
examination of the text of Chinese laws and assertions,
including China’s affirmation of freedom of navigation in
the South China Sea, the Tribunal found that while China
asserted historic rights within the so-called nine dash line
encircling much of the South China Sea, it did not claim
historic title over those waters. (Award, Merits, paras. 225-
228).15
15 The Tribunal’s conclusion that the jurisdictional exception is
inapplicable because China does not claim historic title to the maritime
areas in question would not appear to have required the Tribunal to
determine that the reference to historic bays or titles is independent of
the immediately preceding reference to delimitation in the same clause
of Article 298(1)(a)(i). (See Award, Merits, para. 215). The Tribunal’s
linguistic analysis on the latter point should be approached carefully lest
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III. HISTORIC RIGHTS AND THE NINE-DASH LINE
This finding opened the door to consideration of
perhaps the most fundamental legal issue in the case,
namely the lawfulness of China’s claim of historic rights in
the vast maritime area within the nine-dash line.
As far as the Tribunal is aware, China has
never expressly clarified the nature or scope of
its claimed historic rights. Nor has it ever
clarified its understanding of the meaning of
the ‘nine dash line’. Certain facts can, however,
be established. (Award, Merits, para. 180
(footnote omitted)).
The Tribunal observed that “China’s repeated
invocation of rights ‘formed in the long historical course’
it be read (one trusts misread) to permit a state to avoid compulsory
jurisdiction over a challenge to the legality of a maritime claim that the
state characterizes as a claim to full sovereignty rooted in historic title.
To be sure, the permissibility and effect of a reservation to jurisdiction is
independent of the legality of the action thereby excluded from judicial
review, as the ICJ pointed out in its 1998 judgment dismissing the
Fisheries Jurisdiction case brought by Spain against Canada (paras. 54-
55). But under the Law of the Sea Convention the scope of a permissible
exception to jurisdiction itself depends on the interpretation and
application of Article 298 in the context of other relevant provisions, and
the Tribunal did not have the occasion to address whether this optional
jurisdictional exception applies to unlawful claims to historic bays or
titles. In this regard, it is unclear that a requirement that the claim be
made in good faith would provide an effective solution to the problem.
See note 1 supra.
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and its linkage of this concept with the ‘nine-dash line’
indicates that China understands its rights to extend, in
some form, beyond the maritime zones expressly described
in the Convention.” It analyzed China’s acts and statements
relating to areas that are beyond the maximum entitlements
that could be claimed under the Convention “even if a full
exclusive economic zone were ascribed to the single small
rock above water at high tide.” The Tribunal concluded
“that China does claim rights to petroleum resources and
fisheries within the ‘nine-dash line’ on the basis of historic
rights existing independently of the Convention.” (Award,
Merits, paras. 207-211).
The Tribunal’s analysis of this claim concentrated on
three issues it identified as follows:
(a) First, does the Convention, and in particular
its rules for the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf, allow for the preservation of
rights to living and non-living resources that
are at variance with the provisions of the
Convention and which may have been
established prior to the Convention’s entry into
force by agreement or unilateral act?
(b) Second, prior to the entry into force of the
Convention, did China have historic rights and
jurisdiction over living and non-living
resources in the waters of the South China Sea
beyond the limits of the territorial sea?
(c) Third, and independently of the first two
considerations, has China in the years since the
conclusion of the Convention established
rights and jurisdiction over living and non-
living resources in the waters of the South
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China Sea that are at variance with the
provisions of the Convention? If so, would
such establishment of rights and jurisdiction be
compatible with the Convention? (Award,
Merits, para. 234).
The Tribunal answered the first question in the
negative. It observed that the Convention sets forth a
comprehensive system of rights and freedoms that covers
the oceans as a whole and was intended to supersede prior
inconsistent claims. It noted that the issue of prior fishing
was carefully considered in the particular context of the EEZ:
proposals for protection of traditional fishing rights in the
zone were strongly opposed by China and other coastal
states and were not accepted; the coastal state is merely
obliged to take into account economic dislocation in states
that have habitually fished in the area as one of the relevant
factors in deciding how to allocate access to that portion of
the allowable catch, if any, that is surplus to the coastal
state’s harvesting capacity. As for the continental shelf, the
provisions of the Convention affirm the exclusivity of the
coastal State’s rights, and make no provision for foreign
rights to the natural resources of the continental shelf.
(Award, Merits, paras. 235-254).
The Tribunal also answered the second question in
the negative. It observed that prior to the Convention, and
certainly prior to World War II, most of the South China Sea
was high seas, and “the exercise of freedoms [of the high
seas, including navigation and fishing] permitted under
international law cannot give rise to a historic right; it
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involves nothing that would call for the acquiescence of
other States and can only represent the use of what
international law already freely permits.” (Award, Merits,
paras. 268-269).16
[T]o establish the exclusive historic right to
living and non-living resources within the
‘nine-dash line’, which China now appears to
claim, it would be necessary to show that
China had historically sought to prohibit or
restrict the exploitation of such resources by
the nationals of other States and that those
States had acquiesced in such restrictions. In
the Tribunal’s view, such a claim cannot be
supported. The Tribunal is unable to identify
any evidence that would suggest that China
historically regulated or controlled fishing in
the South China Sea, beyond the limits of the
territorial sea. . . . With respect to the seabed,
the Tribunal does not see any historical activity
that could have been restricted or controlled,
and correspondingly no basis for a historic
right. (Award, Merits, para. 270).
With respect to the third question, the Tribunal
concluded that China has not established rights at variance
with the Convention in the years since the conclusion of the
16 The Tribunal noted that the ICJ Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case
made the same point regarding historic U.S. fishing on Georges Bank.
(Award, Merits, para. 270).
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Convention.17 “The extent of the rights asserted within the
‘nine-dash line’ only became clear with China’s Notes
Verbales of May 2009. Since that date, China’s claims have
been clearly objected to by other States. In the Tribunal’s
view, there is no acquiescence.” (Award, Merits, para. 275).
The Tribunal concluded that “China’s claims to
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with
respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea
encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are
contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the
extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive
limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the
Convention.” (Award, Merits, para. 278).
IV. ISLANDS, ROCKS, AND LOW-TIDE ELEVATIONS
No question was raised in the proceedings regarding
maritime entitlements generated by the Chinese mainland or
nearby islands in accordance with the Convention. The
questions concerned maritime entitlements, if any, generated
by small features at great distances from the Chinese
mainland, namely Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly
Islands,18 where there are extensive overlapping sovereignty
17 Some hesitation in raising this issue at all may be discerned in the
Tribunal’s remarks that it is doing so “for the sake of completeness” and
that it “does not consider it necessary here to address in general whether
and under which conditions the Convention may be modified by State
practice.” (Award, Merits, paras. 273, 275; see also paras. 575, 576).
18 Located in the southern portion of the South China Sea, the Spratly
Islands are a constellation of small islands and coral reefs, existing just
above or below water, that comprise the peaks of undersea mountains
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claims by China and the Philippines, as well as Viet Nam in
the Spratlys. Each of the three occupies some of the Spratly
features. Taiwanese personnel occupy the largest, Itu Aba. In
recent years Chinese ships have denied Philippine vessels
access to the waters of Scarborough Shoal.
The first question posed was whether particular
features occupied by China in the Spratlys were islands, or
rather formed part of the seabed and subsoil. Consistently
with the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice,
the Tribunal made clear that islands are amenable to
appropriation and generate maritime jurisdiction, while
features of the seabed and subsoil (including low-tide
elevations) are not amenable to appropriation and do not
themselves generate maritime jurisdiction. (Award, Merits,
paras. 308-309).
Paragraph 1 of Article 121 of the Convention
provides, “An island is a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”
Under paragraph 2 of Article 121 an island generates the
same maritime entitlements as other land territory, including
a territorial sea with a maximum breadth of 12 nm from the
coastal baselines, an EEZ and continental shelf beyond the
territorial sea with a maximum breadth of 200 nm from
those baselines, and perhaps a broader continental shelf in
areas where the continental margin extends beyond 200 nm.
rising from the deep ocean floor. They were long known principally as a
hazard to navigation and identified on nautical charts as the “dangerous
ground.” (Award, Merits, para. 3).
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Paragraph 3 of Article 121 adds, however: “Rocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.”
Following extensive analysis of the data, the Tribunal
upheld in some but not all cases the Philippine contention
that the features it named were not islands. (Award, Merits,
paras. 382-383).19 The words “naturally formed” in Article
121 were central to the legal inquiry. The Tribunal made
clear that artificial alterations and installations and
structures are not relevant to the determination that a
feature is an island and, if so, to the determination of
whether it can sustain human habitation or economic life of
its own. This in turn required evidence regarding the
features in their natural state.20 The Tribunal observed:
There is no question that all of the
significant high-tide features in the Spratly
Islands are presently controlled by one or
19 If a feature is within 12 nm of an island claimed by the same state,
in terms of the generation of maritime jurisdiction it may make little
difference whether the feature is a low-tide elevation or an island. Under
Article 2(2) of the Convention, the sovereignty of the coastal state over
the territorial sea extends to its bed and subsoil. Under Article 13(1),
“Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an
island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea” from the mainland or the
island.
20 Cf. note 23 infra.
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another of the littoral States, which have
constructed installations and installed
personnel. This presence, however, is
predominantly military or governmental in
nature and involves significant outside supply.
Moreover, many of the high-tide features have
been significantly modified from their natural
condition. Additionally, accounts of current
conditions and human habitation on the
features may reflect deliberate attempts to
colour the description in such a way as to
enhance or reduce the likelihood of the feature
being considered to generate an exclusive
economic zone, depending on the interests of
the State in question. Accordingly, the Tribunal
considers historical evidence of conditions on
the features--prior to the advent of the
exclusive economic zone as a concept or the
beginning of significant human modification--
to represent a more reliable guide to the
capacity of the features to sustain human
habitation or economic life. (Award, Merits,
para. 578).
The present award is the first decision by an
international tribunal in which the issues posed by
paragraph 3 of Article 121 are analyzed in depth.21 The
21 After years of avoiding the issue, in paragraph 183 of its 2012
judgment in the Nicaragua v. Colombia case, the ICJ characterized a coral
outcropping at Quitasueño as a “rock” under paragraph 3 of Article 121,
having noted that there was no dispute in this regard.
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question of whether particular high-tide features are, in the
terminology used by the Tribunal, “fully entitled islands”
under paragraph 2 or “rocks” under paragraph 3, was posed
in two different contexts. The first was the claim by the
Philippines that certain named features occupied by China
were rocks that generated no entitlement to an EEZ or
continental shelf. The second was the claim by the
Philippines that China was unlawfully interfering with the
rights of the Philippines in its EEZ and continental shelf.
Because the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to delimit
overlapping entitlements, it reasoned that the latter claim
could be addressed and upheld only if China were found to
have no coastal state entitlements in the maritime areas in
question. China claims all of the Spratly Islands. A 200-mile
arc around any significant high-tide feature there would
overlap large areas within 200 miles of the Philippines,
including specific areas with respect to which the
Philippines sought an express determination that they were
part of the Philippine EEZ and continental shelf. The
Tribunal accordingly concluded that it needed to determine
whether any of the high-tide features in the Spratlys were
“fully entitled islands” that generate an EEZ and continental
shelf. (Award, Merits, paras. 391-396).
The Tribunal summarized the positions in this regard
as follows:
China considers that it “has, based on
the Nansha Islands as a whole, territorial sea,
exclusive economic zone, and continental
shelf,” but has not explicitly set out its position
on the application of Article 121(3) to each of
the maritime features identified in the
Philippines’ Submissions. China’s general
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 24258
silence in this regard can be contrasted with (a)
the positions of States such as Viet Nam,
Indonesia, and the Philippines that high-tide
features in the Spratly Islands are “rocks” for
purposes of Article 121(3) and should only be
entitled to a 12-nautical mile territorial sea; (b)
the position implied in Malaysia and Viet
Nam’s Joint Submission to the CLCS
[Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf] that sets out official coordinates for the
200-nautical-mile limit of the continental
shelves of the two States, drawn only from
basepoints adjacent to Borneo and the
mainland of Viet Nam and not from any
feature in the Spratlys; and (c) recent assertions
by the Taiwan Authority that Itu Aba
“indisputably qualifies as an ‘island’ according
to the specifications of Article 121 . . . and can
sustain human habitation and economic life of
its own” and “is thus categorically not a
‘rock’.” 22 (Award, Merits, para. 449 (footnotes
omitted)).
In light of China’s assertion that its entitlement to an
EEZ and continental shelf is based on the Nansha [Spratly]
Islands “as a whole,” the Tribunal broached and rejected the
idea that baselines could be drawn around the Spratly
22 Following Taiwan’s assertions, China indicated that it too
regards Itu Aba as a fully entitled island and not a rock. (Award,
Merits, para. 466).
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Islands. It noted that Article 47 of the Convention permits
only archipelagic states comprised exclusively of islands to
draw archipelagic baselines around an offshore archipelago,
adding that archipelagic baselines around the Spratly
Islands also would not satisfy the requirement that the ratio
of water to land within the baselines not exceed nine to one.
The Tribunal went on to observe that Article 7 of the
Convention permits states to draw straight baselines “where
the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.” In
its view, “[n]otwithstanding the practice of some states to
the contrary,” Article 7 does not permit states to draw
straight baselines around offshore archipelagos to
approximate the effect of archipelagic baselines. “Any other
interpretation would effectively render the conditions in
Articles 7 and 47 meaningless.” (Award, Merits, paras. 573-
576).
The Tribunal also noted China’s emphasis on the
importance of Article 121(3) in its diplomatic
communications and statements, including those contesting
Japan’s entitlement to a continental shelf in respect of
Okinotorishima, which China regards as a rock.
Through the statements recounted above,
China has demonstrated a robust stance on the
importance of Article 121(3). It has repeatedly
alluded to the risks to “the common heritage of
mankind” and “overall interests of the
international community” if Article 121(3) is
not properly applied to small features that on
their “natural conditions” obviously cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own. China has not, however, assessed
those factors in any specific analysis of most of
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the individual features in the South China Sea .
. . . (Award, Merits, para. 458).
The Tribunal undertook a lengthy analysis of Article
121(3) before applying it to specific features. The following
are extracts from the Tribunal’s enumeration of its
conclusions regarding the interpretation of the provision.
(Award, Merits, paras. 539-550 (footnotes added)):
First, the use of the word “rock” does not limit
the provision to features composed of solid
rock. The geological and geomorphological
characteristics of a high-tide feature are not
relevant to its classification pursuant to Article
121(3).23
23 In this regard, the Tribunal observed (Award, Merits, para. 481):
Within Article 121, rocks are a category of island. An
island is defined as a “naturally formed area of land,”
without any geological or geomorphological
qualification. Introducing a geological qualification in
paragraph (3) would mean that any high-tide features
formed by sand, mud, gravel, or coral--irrespective of
their other characteristics--would always generate
extended maritime entitlements, even if they were
incapable of sustaining human habitation or an
economic life of their own. Such features are more
ephemeral than a geological rock and may shift location
or appear and disappear above high water as a result of
conditions over time. A geological criterion would thus
accord greater entitlements to less stable and less
permanent features. This cannot have been the intent of
the Article.
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Second, the status of a feature is to be
determined on the basis of its natural capacity,
without external additions or modifications
intended to increase its capacity to sustain
human habitation or an economic life of its
own.24
Third, with respect to “human habitation”, the
critical factor is [its] non-transient character,
such that the inhabitants can fairly be said to
constitute the natural population of the feature,
for whose benefit the resources of the exclusive
economic zone were seen to merit protection.25
Fourth, the “economic life” must be oriented
around the feature itself. Economic activity
that is entirely dependent on external resources
or devoted to using a feature as an object for
extractive activities without the involvement of
a local population would fall inherently short
with respect to this necessary link to the
feature itself.
24 “Just as a low-tide elevation or area of seabed cannot be legally
transformed into an island through human efforts, the Tribunal
considers that a rock cannot be transformed into a fully entitled island
through land reclamation. The status of a feature must be assessed on the
basis of its natural condition.” (Award, Merits, para. 508).
25 While the Tribunal did not import concepts such as domicile or
habitual residence from private international law, some resonance may
be discerned.
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Fifth, the ability to sustain either human
habitation or an economic life of its own would
suffice to entitle a high-tide feature to an
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
However, as a practical matter, a maritime
feature will ordinarily only possess an
economic life of its own if it is also inhabited
by a stable human community.
Sixth, Article 121(3) is concerned with the
capacity of a maritime feature to sustain human
habitation or an economic life of its own, not
with whether the feature is presently, or has
been, inhabited or home to economic life.
Seventh, the principal factors that contribute to
the natural capacity of a feature would include
the presence of water, food, and shelter in
sufficient quantities to enable a group of
persons to live on the feature for an
indeterminate period of time.
Eighth, the capacity of a feature should be
assessed with due regard to the potential for a
group of small island features to collectively
sustain human habitation and economic life.
Ninth, evidence of physical conditions will
ordinarily suffice only to classify features that
clearly fall within one category or the other. [It]
is insufficient for features that fall close to the
line. In such circumstances, the Tribunal
considers that the most reliable evidence of the
capacity of a feature will usually be the
historical use to which it has been put.
Humans have shown no shortage of ingenuity
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in establishing communities in the far reaches
of the world, often in extremely difficult
conditions.
The physical characteristics of Scarborough Shoal and
many of the high-tide features of the Spratlys leave little
room for doubt that they are rocks under paragraph 3 of
Article 121. Most attention was focused on the principal
features in the Spratlys, 26 including the largest, Itu Aba.27
Based on its detailed analysis of physical characteristics, the
Tribunal concluded:
The principal features of the Spratly
Islands are not barren rocks or sand cays,
devoid of fresh water, that can be dismissed as
uninhabitable on the basis of their physical
characteristics alone. At the same time, the
features are not obviously habitable, and their
26 The award specifically addresses Itu Aba, Thitu, West York,
Spratly Island, South-West Cay, and North-East Cay. “The Tribunal has
also considered, and reaches the same conclusion with respect to, the
other, less significant high-tide features in the Spratly Islands, which are
even less capable of sustaining [human habitation or economic life], but
does not consider it necessary to list them individually.” (Award, Merits,
paras. 622, 625).
27 The surface area of Itu Aba is approximately 0.43 km2. It is barely
over 200 nm from the Philippine Island of Palawan and well over 500 nm
from Hainan Island off the Chinese mainland. Noting that China, in a
letter previously delivered to the individual members of the Tribunal,
“objected strongly to the possibility of any site visit to the South China
Sea,” the Tribunal did not pursue “the Taiwan Authority of China’s
public offer to arrange a site visit to Itu Aba.” (Award, Merits, para. 142).
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capacity even to enable human survival
appears to be distinctly limited. In these
circumstances, . . . the Tribunal considers that
the physical characteristics of the features do
not definitively indicate the capacity of the
features. Accordingly, the Tribunal is called
upon to consider the historical evidence of
human habitation and economic life on the
Spratly Islands and the implications of such
evidence for the natural capacity of the
features. (Award, Merits, para. 616).
After reviewing that evidence, it concluded as
follows:
The Tribunal sees no indication that
anything fairly resembling a stable human
community has ever formed on the Spratly
Islands. Rather, the islands have been a
temporary refuge and base of operations for
fishermen and a transient residence for
labourers engaged in mining and fishing. The
introduction of the exclusive economic zone
was not intended to grant extensive maritime
entitlements to small features whose historical
contribution to human settlement is as slight as
that. Nor was the exclusive economic zone
intended to encourage States to establish
artificial populations in the hope of making
expansive claims, precisely what has now
occurred in the South China Sea. On the
contrary, Article 121(3) was intended to
prevent such developments and to forestall a
provocative and counterproductive effort to
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manufacture entitlements. (Award, Merits,
para. 621).
The Tribunal also determined that the history of
economic activity in the Spratly Islands (i.e., mining for
guano, collecting shells, and fishing) does not satisfy the
standard that such activity “be oriented around the feature
itself and not be focused solely on the surrounding territorial
sea or entirely dependent on external resources.” It added
that “extractive economic activity, without the presence of a
stable local community, necessarily falls short of constituting
the economic life of the feature.” (Award, Merits, para. 623).
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that “none of
the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands is capable of
sustaining human habitation or an economic life of their
own” and therefore “such features shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf.” (Award, Merits, paras.
554-570, 626).
V. ACTIONS REGARDING THE PHILIPPINE EEZ AND
CONTINENTAL SHELF
Having determined that China has no entitlement to
an EEZ and continental shelf that overlaps the EEZ and
continental shelf of the Philippines in the areas in question,
the Tribunal proceeded to address the conformity with the
Convention of China’s actions and activities. The Tribunal
did not regard China’s communication to the Philippines or
its nationals or licensees of China’s claims to maritime areas
within 200 nm of the Philippines as constituting a violation
of the Convention. It did however regard the physical
interception by Chinese marine surveillance vessels in 2011
of a ship carrying out seismic activities under Philippine
authorization at Reed Bank, and the order to stop those
activities and leave the area, as a violation of the Philippines’
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exclusive rights with respect to its continental shelf. And it
found that China’s construction activities at Mischief Reef
violate the Philippines’ rights with respect to its EEZ and
continental shelf, including those concerning the
construction of artificial islands, installations and structures
under Articles 60 and 80. The Tribunal also determined that
a 2012 fishing moratorium declared by China in the northern
part of the South China Sea “established a realistic prospect
that Filipino fisherman, seeking to exploit the resources of
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, could be exposed
to the punitive measures spelled out in the moratorium” and
constituted a violation of the Philippines’ rights in its EEZ.
In addition, citing the 2015 ITLOS fisheries advisory opinion,
the Tribunal found “that China has, through the operation of
its marine surveillance vessels in tolerating and failing to
exercise due diligence to prevent fishing by Chinese flagged
vessels at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal in May
2013, failed to exhibit due regard for the Philippines’
sovereign rights with respect to fisheries in its exclusive
economic zone.” (Award, Merits, paras. 708, 712, 757, 1043).
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL DUTIES
The Tribunal held that China’s failure to take steps to
prevent environmental harm by its fishing vessels violated
its environmental duties under the Convention. While no
claims were made under the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) as such, the Tribunal noted that “CITES is the
subject of nearly universal adherence, including by the
Philippines and China, and in the Tribunal’s view forms part
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of the general corpus of international law that informs the
content of Article 192 and 194(5) of the Convention.”28
Accordingly “Article 192 includes a due diligence obligation
to prevent the harvesting of species that are recognised
internationally as being at risk of extinction and requiring
international protection.” (Award, Merits, para. 956).
28 Part XII of the Convention addresses protection and preservation
of the marine environment. It opens with one of rare unqualified
statements of a basic environmental duty in a widely ratified treaty:
Article 192 provides, in its entirety, “States have the obligation to protect
and preserve the marine environment.” The article’s general language
“is informed by the other provisions of Part XII and other applicable
rules of international law.” (Award, Merits, para. 941). Paragraph 5 of
Article 194 adds, “The measures taken in accordance with this Part shall
include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile
ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered
species and other forms of marine life.” The Tribunal cited the statement
by ITLOS in paragraph 70 of its 1999 provisional measures order in the
Southern Bluefin Tuna case that “the conservation of the living resources
of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine
environment.” (Award, Merits, para. 956).
In this regard it may be recalled that the executive branch
commentary that accompanied submission of the Convention to the U.S.
Senate some years earlier states, “The term ‘marine environment,’ as
used in the Convention, includes ‘marine life,’” and accordingly a
tribunal’s authority under Article 290 to prescribe provisional measures
to prevent serious harm to the marine environment includes
“provisional conservation measures for living marine resources . . .
whether or not such measures are necessary to protect the respective
rights of the parties.” (Treaty Doc. 103-39, p. 85 (1994)).
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The Tribunal . . . considers the
harvesting of sea turtles, species threatened
with extinction, to constitute a harm to the
marine environment as such. The Tribunal
further has no doubt that the harvesting of
corals and giant clams from the waters
surrounding Scarborough Shoal and features
in the Spratly Islands, on the scale that appears
in the record before it, has a harmful impact on
the fragile marine environment. The Tribunal
therefore considers that a failure to take
measures to prevent these practices would
constitute a breach of Articles 192 and 194(5) of
the Convention . . . . (Award, Merits, para. 960).
[A]dopting appropriate rules and
measures to prohibit a harmful practice is only
one component of the due diligence required
by States . . . . There is no evidence in the
record that would indicate that China has
taken any steps to enforce those rules and
measures against fishermen engaged in
poaching of endangered species. Indeed, at
least with respect to the April 2012 incidents,
the evidence points directly to the contrary.
China was aware of the harvesting of giant
clams. It did not merely turn a blind eye to this
practice. Rather, it provided armed
government vessels to protect the fishing
boats. (Award, Merits, para. 964).
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The most serious environmental harm in the Spratlys
was the direct result of construction activities undertaken by
China on seven reefs29 while the dispute was before the
Tribunal.
The massive island-building project that China
has embarked on since the end of 2013
. . . far exceeds the scale of . . . earlier
construction projects” in the Spratlys by China
or other states, including the Philippines and
Viet Nam. (Award, Merits, para. 854).
Whatever other States have done within the
South China Sea, it pales in comparison to
China’s recent construction. (Award, Merits,
para. 1178).
[T]he record shows that since the end of 2013,
China has created on top of the coral reefs
approximately 12.8 million square metres of
land, from millions of tons of dredged coral,
rocks and sand. There is no question that the
artificial island-building program is part of an
official Chinese policy and program
implemented by organs of the Chinese State.
(Award, Merits, para. 976).
29 Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson
Reef, Hughes Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. (Award, Merits, para.
852).
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The conclusions of the Tribunal-appointed
independent experts are unequivocal with
respect to the more recent construction
activities, which they say have “impacted reefs
on a scale unprecedented in the region.” They
cite a 2016 study analysing satellite imagery
that found up to 60 percent of the shallow reef
habitat at the seven reefs has been directly
destroyed. Construction-related sedimentation
and turbidity have affected large portions of
the reefs beyond the immediate area of
construction. (Award, Merits, para. 978
(footnotes omitted)).
“Based on the compelling evidence, expert reports,
and critical assessment of Chinese claims” regarding
environmental effects, the Tribunal concluded that “China’s
artificial island-building activities on the seven reefs in the
Spratly Islands have caused devastating and long-lasting
damage to the marine environment.”30 The Tribunal found
30 The Tribunal quoted various passages from reports by the experts
it appointed. Each of the points below regarding the nature and duration
of the harm is separately excerpted from the passages quoted in
paragraph 979 of the award:
--The harm caused by direct burial of reef habitat
during the construction of artificial islands is near-
permanent.
--The . . . harm to areas affected by dredging for
navigable channels and basins will likely be near-
permanent and . . . the prospects for rejuvenation are
2017 THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 271
that “through its construction activities, China has breached
its obligation under Article 192 to protect and preserve the
marine environment, has conducted dredging in such a way
as to pollute the marine environment with sediment in
breach of Article 194(1), and has violated its duty under
Article 194(5) to take measures necessary to protect and
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms
of marine life.” There was also “no convincing evidence of
low, particularly as long as maintenance dredging for
the use of the artificial islands continues.
--[W]here major geomorphological structures [of the
reefs] have been removed through dredging . . . there is
little prospect for recovery on ecological time scales.
These structures constitute accumulated reef growth on
geological time scales of centuries to millennia.
--Harm to areas affected by smothering of sediments
and increased turbidity . . . is likely to endure for years
to decades within the lagoons (due to limited water
exchange), and for weeks to months on the outer reef
slopes. Rejuvenation of these areas is possible . . . but
will take several decades, and it will likely take centuries
for large massive colonies to regrow.
--China’s construction activities have led to . . .
significant reductions of nursery habitat for a number of
fish species. . . . The construction activities thus will have
a broader impact on the marine ecosystem in and
around the South China Sea and on fisheries resources.
However, the magnitude of this impact . . . is difficult to
quantify due to a lack of empirical studies.
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China attempting to cooperate or coordinate with the other
States bordering the South China Sea” in this regard.
Moreover, notwithstanding China’s repeated assurances that
it has undertaken environmental studies, “neither the
Tribunal, the Tribunal-appointed experts, the Philippines,
nor the Philippines’ experts have been able to identify any
report that would resemble an environmental impact
assessment that meets the requirements of Article 206 of the
Convention.” 31 (Award, Merits, paras. 976, 983, 986, 989).
VII. SCARBOROUGH SHOAL
The Tribunal found that Scarborough Shoal is a rock
under Article 121(3) and accordingly generates a territorial
sea but not an EEZ. (Award, Merits, para. 554). The parties’
dispute regarding sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal and
the territorial sea it generates was not before the Tribunal.
China’s efforts to block Philippine access to the
waters of Scarborough Shoal prompted two different claims
that were upheld: (1) that China has unlawfully prevented
Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by
interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough
Shoal, and (2) that China breached its obligations under the
Convention by operating its law enforcement vessels in a
dangerous manner causing serious risk to Philippine
31 “[T]he Tribunal directly invited the Chinese Government ‘to
indicate whether it has conducted an environmental impact study per
Article 206 of the Convention and, if so, to provide the Tribunal with a
copy.’ China did not respond to the Tribunal’s request” either directly or
by other means. (Award, Merits, paras. 924, 991).
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government vessels navigating in the vicinity of
Scarborough Shoal.
VIII. TRADITIONAL ARTISANAL FISHING
Drawing on the analysis in the 1999 award in the
Eritrea v. Yemen arbitration and other decisions, the Tribunal
observed that the “legal basis for protecting artisanal fishing
stems from the notion of vested rights and the
understanding that, having pursued a livelihood through
artisanal fishing over an extended period, generations of
fishermen have acquired a right, akin to property, in the
ability to continue to fish in the manner of their forebears.”
The Tribunal distinguished the legal situation in the
territorial sea from that in the EEZ. As previously noted, the
Convention addresses, and rejects, traditional fishing rights
in the EEZ. On the other hand, as noted by the 2015 award in
the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, the provisions
on the territorial sea include a general reference to
“international law” in Article 2(3) that the Tribunal held to
include prior traditional fishing rights protected by
international law. In this regard the Tribunal noted that “the
vast majority of traditional fishing takes place in close
proximity to the coast.” The Tribunal accepted the claims of
both the Philippines and China to have traditionally fished
at the shoal. On the grounds that the protected rights are
“customary rights, acquired through long usage,” it limited
them generally to “artisanal fishing in keeping with the
traditions and customs of the region.” It also acknowledged
that such rights are subject to reasonable regulation by the
coastal state. (Award, paras. 798, 802-809).
Having noted that China excluded all Philippine
fishing vessels while allowing Chinese vessels to continue to
fish, and that “it would have reached exactly the same
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conclusion had the Philippines established control over
Scarborough Shoal and acted in a discriminatory manner to
exclude Chinese fishermen engaged in traditional fishing,”
the Tribunal found “that China has, through the operation of
its official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May 2012
onwards, unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from
engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal,”
adding “that this decision is entirely without prejudice to the
question of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal.” (Award,
Merits, paras. 812, 814).
IX. OPERATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT VESSELS
The Philippine claim regarding the operation of
Chinese law enforcement vessels referred to two near
collisions with Philippine government vessels. One occurred
on April 28, 2012 when two Philippine Coast Guard vessels
were approached at significant speed by a Chinese law
enforcement vessel. Another occurred on May 26, 2012 when
a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
vessel attempting to resupply a Philippines Coast Guard
vessel was repeatedly approached by several Chinese law
enforcement vessels.
The Tribunal found that the rules set forth in the
widely ratified Convention on the International Regulations
for Preventing of Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS) are
incorporated by reference into the Law of the Sea
Convention by virtue of the duty of the flag State under
Article 94(5) to conform to generally accepted international
regulations, procedures and practices with respect to matters
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such as the use of signals, the maintenance of
communications and the prevention of collisions.
Accordingly, a violation of COLREGS constitutes a violation
of the Convention. (Award, Merits, para. 1082-1083).32
The Tribunal noted that the dispute with respect to
the operation of the Chinese law enforcement vessels relates
principally to events that occurred in the territorial sea of
Scarborough Shoal. Accordingly, while Articles 58 and 86 of
the Convention provide that Article 94 applies to the EEZ
and the high seas beyond, the obligation to observe the
COLREGS under Article 94 presumably applies to the
territorial sea as well. 33 (Award, Merits, paras. 1045, 1060;
Award, Jurisdiction, para. 410).
32 Insofar as Article 94 requires observance of the COLREGS, that
obligation may be limited by the COLREGS themselves. Under Rule 1(a)
the COLREGS apply to the high seas and all waters connected with the
high seas and navigable by seagoing vessels, subject under Rule 1(b) to
special coastal state rules for “roadsteads, harbours, rivers, lakes or
inland waterways.”
33 This ensures a coherent application of the Convention. Article
21(4) expressly requires ships in innocent passage through the territorial
sea to comply with generally accepted international regulations relating
to the prevention of collisions at sea. Similarly, Article 39(2)(a) contains
an express requirement of compliance with the COLREGS while a ship is
in transit passage through the territorial sea in straits. What of ships in
the territorial sea that are not exercising the right of innocent passage or
transit passage, such as those registered in the coastal state? Regulations
to avoid collisions cannot achieve their purpose unless the same rules are
observed by all ships navigating in the same area. The duty of the coastal
state under Articles 24, 42 and 44 not to hamper innocent passage or
transit passage may be relevant in this regard.
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The expert appointed by the Tribunal, after an
analysis of the incidents, concluded that the Chinese
maneuvers on both occasions “demonstrated a complete
disregard for the observance and practice of good
seamanship including the ordinary practice of seamen but
most importantly, a total disregard for the observance of the
collision regulations.” (Award, Merits, para. 1089). The
Tribunal agreed, noting:
Where Chinese vessels were under an
obligation to yield, they persisted; where the
regulations called for a safe distance, they
infringed it. The actions are not suggestive of
occasional negligence in failing to adhere to the
COLREGS, but rather point to a conscious
disregard of what the regulations require. The
various violations are underscored by factors
such as the large disparity in size of the
Chinese and Philippine vessels, the shallow
waters in which the incidents took place, and
the creation of a two metre-high wake causing
additional risk to the Philippines’ crews.
(Award, Merits, para. 1105).
Noting that operational requirements of law
enforcement vessels “occasionally stand in tension with the
obligations imposed by the COLREGS,” the Tribunal
“having considered possible circumstances precluding
wrongfulness has found no convincing evidence that the
aforementioned violations are excusable by any mitigating
circumstances.” It added, “The same conclusions about
violations of the navigational safety provisions of the
Convention would be reached irrespective of which State
has sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal. The Tribunal does
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not purport to make a finding on that question.” (Award,
Merits, paras. 1107-1108).
X. AGGRAVATION AND EXTENSION OF THE DISPUTE
The Philippines twice amended its claims to address
actions that, in the Philippine view, aggravated and
extended the dispute after it was submitted to arbitration.
The first amendment concerned Chinese actions to prevent
rotation of Philippine personnel at Second Thomas Shoal
that commenced shortly after the dispute was submitted to
arbitration. The second amendment concerned China’s
dredging, artificial island-building, and construction
activities at the seven reefs discussed above. As previously
noted, the Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to
address the first amendment by virtue of the exception for
military activities in Article 298, but that the military
activities exception did not apply to China’s construction
activities at the seven reefs in light of China’s affirmations of
their civilian character.
While there is an extensive jurisprudence on the duty
to refrain from aggravating or extending a dispute before an
international tribunal, the issue typically arises in the context
of a request for provisional measures. There was no such
request in this case. In this regard the Tribunal observed:
[T]he proper understanding of this extensive
jurisprudence on provisional measures is that
there exists a duty on parties engaged in a
dispute settlement procedure to refrain from
aggravating or extending the dispute or
disputes at issue during the pendency of the
settlement process. This duty exists
independently of any order from a court or
tribunal to refrain from aggravating or
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extending the dispute and stems from the
purpose of dispute settlement and the status of
the States in question as parties in such a
proceeding. Indeed, when a court or tribunal
issues provisional measures directing a party
to refrain from actions that would aggravate or
extend the dispute, it is not imposing a new
obligation on the parties, but rather recalling to
the parties an obligation that already exists by
virtue of their involvement in the proceedings.
(Award, Merits, para. 1169).
In the present case, the Tribunal concluded that this
duty arises from the provisions of the Convention regarding
the settlement of disputes as well as Article 300 regarding
good faith and abuse of rights, and that this duty also arises
from rules of international law not incompatible with the
Convention to the which Tribunal may have recourse under
Article 293. (Award, Merits, para. 1173). It concluded that
China’s dredging, artificial island-building, and construction
activities have aggravated and extended the dispute in
several ways:
First, China has effectively created a fait
accompli at Mischief Reef by constructing a
large artificial island on a low-tide elevation
located within the Philippines’ exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf . . . . In
practical terms, the implementation of the
Tribunal’s decision will be significantly more
difficult for the Parties, and Mischief Reef
cannot be returned to its original state, before
China’s construction work was begun.
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Second, China has aggravated the Parties’
dispute with respect to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment by
causing irreparable harm to the coral reef
habitat [at the seven reefs previously
discussed] . . . . In practical terms, neither this
decision nor any action that either Party may
take in response can undo the permanent
damage that has been done to the coral reef
habitats of the South China Sea.
Finally, China has undermined the integrity of
these proceedings and rendered the task before
the Tribunal more difficult. At the same time
that the Tribunal was called upon to determine
the status of features in the Spratly Islands and
the entitlements that such features were
capable of generating, China has permanently
destroyed evidence of the natural status of
those same features. . . . Despite this, the
Tribunal has reached a decision on the status of
features in the South China Sea using the best
evidence available to it and drawing heavily on
historical sources. The Tribunal is satisfied that
its decisions regarding the status of features
are well founded in fact, but records that they
were rendered significantly more difficult by
China’s works at the features in question.
China has been free to represent itself in these
proceedings in the manner it considered most
appropriate, including by refraining from any
formal appearance, as it has in fact done. . . .
China is not free, however, to act to undermine
the integrity of these proceedings or to
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frustrate the effectiveness of the Tribunal’s
decisions. (Award, Merits, paras. 1177-80).
XI. POST SCRIPT
China continued to rehearse its jurisdictional
objections notwithstanding their rejection in the award on
jurisdiction. It has now adopted a similar posture regarding
the award on the merits.34 That may continue to be its official
response to any invocation of the award, at least for now.
But both in the near term and in the longer term, the
award’s actual impact on perceptions and behavior is a
different matter. One would not, for example, argue that the
award as such is legally binding as between states other than
China and the Philippines. Yet the perceptions of those that
border and use the South China Sea, and indeed the seas and
oceans beyond, will unquestionably be affected by this
authoritative contribution to the law of the sea and its
application to one of the world’s most important seas.
34 There have been fleeting intimations for some time that China
might consider denouncing the Convention following the award. Quite
apart from the fact that denunciation would not relieve China of its
obligations under the award or enhance the legitimacy of its claims in
the South China Sea or elsewhere, it would prejudice China’s standing
and economic, environmental, political, and security interests as a coastal
state and maritime state in a globally accepted Convention whose
comprehensive substantive and institutional provisions govern two-
thirds of the planet. An apt metaphor might be China’s reported burning
of its fleet after Admiral Zheng He’s last voyage.
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Among the effects over the long term may be a
reduction in the temptation to invoke historic use of the high
seas as a legal basis for claims of control, a tempering of
disputes over small features at sea and the entitlements they
generate, a decline in gratuitous environmental disruption
occasioned by attempts to artificially enhance such features
to reinforce claims to maritime jurisdiction, heightened
scrutiny of the destruction of coral reefs and endangered
species, avoidance of dangerous law enforcement tactics at
sea, and increased appreciation of the contributions of the
Law of the Sea Convention and its compulsory dispute
settlement system to the rule of law in international affairs.















































Mercator / WGS84Map 1
Coral Reef data from ‘Global Distribution of Coral Reefs’
UNEP-WCMC, WorldFish Centre, WRI
and TNC (The Nature Conservancy) (2010).
http://datadownload.unep-wcmc.org/requests/new?dataset=WCMC008_CoralReef2010_v1_3
This map is for illustrative purposes only.
T H E S O U T H C H I N A S E A





















+%* .612% ,%#75 .*5 /43#2452#67
/'54- 6( )& 81:$ &0)!
9


































































Mercator / WGS84Map 3
This map is for illustrative purposes only.
T H E S O U T H C H I N A S E A :
S O U T H E R N A R E A
Coral Reef data from ‘Global Distribution of Coral Reefs’
UNEP-WCMC, WorldFish Centre, WRI
and TNC (The Nature Conservancy) (2010).
http://datadownload.unep-wcmc.org/requests/new?dataset=WCMC008_CoralReef2010_v1_3
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Figure 2
The South China Sea Arbitration
Award of 12 July 2016
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Figure 2: Map attached to China’s 7 May 2009 Notes Verbales
Attachment to Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/17/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Note
Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 192).
